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<J--~~~ blood-grouping test in a paternity suit? 
~
FACTS & DECISION BELOW: The appe mother bro ught a paternity 
suit against appt in state trial court. Appt moved the court to 
order blood grouping tests on appe and the child 11ursuant to Conn. 
Gen. Stat. §46b-168 (1979), which authorizes the court to order 
such 'tests on motion of any party and provides that the costs 
thereof will be paid by the movant. A~pt asserted that he was 






State pay for the tests. 
~ . I,\'\ ifu~f CYJ~es 




Th~ court denied the motion insofar as it requested state-
furnished tests. No tests were made, and the court held that 
• 
appt was the child's father. The Appellate Session affirmed on 
the authority of Ferro v. Morgan, 35 Conn. Sup.· 689, 406 A.2d 
873, cert. denied, 177 Conn. 753, 399 A.2d 526 (1979), and ~nox 
v. Siddell, Conn. Sup. A.2d (1979). 
In Ferro, the Appe llate Ses sion had rejected due process and 
equal protection challenges to§ 46b-168. With respect to the 
due process clause, the Court reasoned that Bodde v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371 (1971), did not require state-furnished tests. Bodde 
held that the due process clause barred a State from charging 
. ·"---- indigents a fee to obtain a divorce, but the Court carefully 
limited its holding to the facts presented. The Appellate Session 
pointed out that paternity suits in Connecticut are civil, not 
criminal. They result only in money obligations, not imprisonment; 
and although a father can be jailed for wilful refusal to make 
support payments, he could not be imprisoned because of good-faith 
inability to make the payments due to indigency. The Court also 
questioned whether blood-grouping tests were as "crucial" evidence 
as the father maintained. Nor did the Appellate Session find a 
denial of equal protection. Applying rational basis scrutiny, 
it held that the State could reasonably place the expense of the 
te~t on the party who desired the evidence. The Appellate Session 




In the present case, the appt, after J.osing ·in the Appellate 
Session on the basis of Ferr~ and Knox, sought certification in 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut. That court denied certification 
and this appeal followed. 
CONTENTIONS: Appt contends that there is a major split among . 
state courts over whether the State must pay for the costs of -----------~--......... ---blood-grouping tests when the putative father is indigent. The ~-- ---------large majority of states courts reaching the question have held 
that state-provided tests are required~ Franklin \~. District Court:, 
194 Colo. 189, 571 P.2d 1072 (1977); Commonwealth v. Possehl, 
355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E. 2d 667 (1969); Graves v. Daugherty, No. 
14517 (W.VA. 1980); Commissioner of Social Services v. Laredo, 
100 Misc. 2d 220, 417 N.Y.S. 2d 665 (Family Ct. 1979). The majority 
of other states provide free blood-grouping tests _to indigents by 
statute. The only two States statutorily requiring the party re-
questing blood-grouping tests to pay the costs in advance are 
Connecticut and North Carolina. 
The present case is governed by Bodde, supra. Given the 
distinctive nature of paternity proceedings and the remarkable 
effectiveness with which modern blood tests conclusively exonerate -----~------
falsely accused defendants, the denial of a blood test to a putative --------------father solely because of his indigency is the denial of a fundrunen-
tal constitutional right. Because blood groupinE tests are so 
effective, they are an essential component of the "opportunity to 
be heard" in civil proceedings. 
( 
-l·-
Appt seeks to distinguish two other decisions in this Court: 
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (indigent petitioner in 
bankruptcy must pay filing fee), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 
656 (1973) (no waiver of filing fees for indigent wishing to 
appeal denial of welfare benefits). Appt suggests six reasons why 
Kras and Schwab are inapplicable. First, because his presence in 
court is involuntary, appt stands in the same position as a de-
fendant in a criminal case. Second, in paternity suits, unlike 
ordinary civil cases, the putative father is subject to a range 
of criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions for non-support. Third, 
although this is nominally a private suit, the State is directly 
involved in that (a) the mother was on welfare and was required to 
disclose the name of the putative father in order to continue re-
ceiving support, (b) the State referred the matter to the mother's 
attorney for prosecution, (c) the State paid the attorney's fee, 
and (d) the State is the actual recipient of the support money 
awarded by the trial court. Fourth, in Connecticut the putative 
father cannot rebut the mother's prima facie case of paternity 
simply with his own testimony, but must introduce independent evi-
dence. Fifth, paternity suits by their nature involve the family 
rights of the father, rights which the Court is incr~asingly re-
cognizing as significant. Finally, Connecticut's blood test law 
will create a dual system of justice with substan:ial, adverse, and 
recprring impact on indigent defendants. 
Appe has filed a motion to dismiss or affirm. A paternity 
action in Connecticut is civil in nature. Rober t3 on v. Apuzzo, 
170 Conn. 367, 365 A.2d 824, cert denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976). The 
decision in Bodde governs civil proceedings and d1)es not require 
... 
-5-
state-provided blood grouping tests to indigent defendants. To 
grant a free test would be to subsidize the putative father's 
defense. Nor does§ 46b-168 violate equal protection, since it 
is supported by rational basis. 
DISCUSSION: This is a proper appeal. The Franklin and 
Possehl cases are squarely in conflict with the decision below. 
Graves v. Daugherty and Commissioner of Social Services v. Laredo 
also conflict in result, although it is not entirely clear that 
those cases are based on federal law. 
On the merits, it seems that the cases requiring state-paid 
blood grouping tests have read Bodde very expansively indeed, and 
have perhaps paid insufficient attention to Kras and Schwab. It 
is nevertheless true that paternity suits involve different con-
( (:, siderations than ordinary civil litigation. The quest:i.on is not 
so clearly foreclosed by previous cases that affirrnance is in 
order. I recommend that the Court note probable jurisdiction. 
There is a response. 
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Also motion to dismiss or affirm. 
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Question Presented 
Whether Connecticut is constitutionally required to 
pay for blood tests requested by the putative father, in 
proceedings to establish paternity that the state requires 




In 1975, appellee, who is unmarried, gave birth to a 
In order to continue receiving public assistance 
from the state of Connecticut, she was required by law to 
disclose the identity of the father, who she said was 
appellant. The state then retained a lawyer to bring a 
paternity action against appellant, with appellee as the the 
named plaintiff. When the action was filed in 1977, appellant 
was incarcerated in a state prison. Because he was totally 
indigent, appellant filed a motion for blood tests in forma 
pauperis--i.e., funded by the state. This motion was denied. 
The case went to trial in 1978. At that point , 
appellant was still in prison and had been unable to pay for 
blood tests, which cost about $250 at that time. 1 After a 
trial at which appellant and appellee testified, the court 
entered an order finding appellant to be the father. At a 
later hearing, the court found appellant liable for $6,974.48, 
representing the maintenance and support costs of the child 
until that date. Appellant is also obligated to provide 
support for the child whenever he is able to do so, until she 
comes of age. All of this money is owed directly to the sta e 
because appellee and the daughter are on welfare. Appellant 
1The cost in Connecticut has now risen to well over $400. 
It is not clear whether this sum represents the cost for tests 
for all three parties, or only for each of them. 
' These blood tests have the capacity to exonerate 
over 90% of all falsely accused fathers. 
.. 
3. 
is presently paying $2 per month. 
Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for 
blood tests paid for by the state. In so doing, he did not 
challenge a state statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168, 
directly, because that statute had not yet been construed as 
requiring the movant in a paternity suit to bear such costs. 
Prior to the decision on appeal, the Appellate Session of the 
Superior Court decided Ferro v. Morgan, 35 Conn. Supp. 679, 
406 A.2d 873, cert. denied, 177 Conn. 753, 399 A.2d 526 
(1979). Ferro construed the statute as mandating payment by 
the movant, 2 and upheld the constitutionality of the statute, 
as so construed. In this case, the Appellate Session relied 
on Ferro and rejected appellant's appeal in a short per curiam 
opinion. The state supreme court denied review. 
In Connecticut, a paternity suit is a civil 
proceeding. The law provides that the consistent accusations 
of a mother cannot be rebutted solely by denials from the 
defendant male. Kelsaw v. Green, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516, 276 
A.2d 909 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1971). It also provides that a 
court may enforce its paternity finding with civil contempt 
sanctions if the father refuses to make the required support 
2The statute provides that the court may order any party in 
a paternity suit to undergo blood tests. It then states that 
the "costs of m king such tests shall be chargeable against 




a possibility of 
• § 4~b-17lf. Thehre is, in additidon, J>~~ 
sanctions or sue nonsupport, un er - ~t----, 
id. , ~case, the fact of paternity 
~~ 
§ 53-304 (a). In 




civil paternity action like the one at issue here. 
Discussion 
There are two possible theories for explaining why 
appellant has a constitutional right to have blood tests paid 
for--due process and equal protection. These may be treated 
separately, al though in this area they tend to merge. See, 
~, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1963) (right to free 
transcript on criminal appeal): cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600, 608 (1974) ("The precise rationale for the Griffin and 
Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated 
. " ) . 
The parties give greater emphasis to the due process 
theory, and it is, in my view, the stronger argument for 
appellant. The argument is the following: The state has 
initiated a civil lawsuit to declare appellant the father of 
" --------- ---, 
appellee's child. In doing so, the state is seeking to obtain 
support payments for itself, since appellee and her daughter 
are on welfare. The effect of the verdict against appellant 
is that he is obligated to make such payments when he is able 
to do so, and may suffer imprisonment if he fails to pay. In 
5. 
addition, this verdict constitutes a final determination that 
appellant and the child are father and daughter--a //~ 
determination with other consequenc: for bot~ appe~a:t ~
the child. When the state initiates a lawsuit with these ~ 
possible consequences--both financial and personal--due ~ --process considerations become important. Here, there exists a ~ 
test that can conclusively exonerate the vast majority of ~ 
innocent men. The state cannot simply allow putative fathers ~ 
to pay for such tests if they are able, especially where i~, 
rules of evidence make the only other evidence the defendant ~ 
I~ - 7 
~~is likely to have--his own testimony--legally insufficient to ~ 
~ overcome the accusations of the mother. In this setting, 
RV!~ indigent m:fnfe:e::~::n:: t::: :::c:::e aa:ya:::a:i:::ec:~ey are 
The state responds that this is a civil case and due 
process does not require more than a trial at which the 
putative father is allowed to introduce any competent 
evidence. Only once has the Court required the states to make 
affirmative efforts to improve the lot of indigents in civil 
f\ ~.i cases,VBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and there 
~ ~ filing fees at issue were preventing all access to the 
.~~ courts for divorce proceedings. This case does not become 
~~ criminal merely because a father may be jailed for failing to 
make support payments. This incarceration is akin to a 
finding of contempt of court, and serves merely to enforce the 
court's orders. 
It is important to recognize, first of all, that the 
due process argument raised by appellant here is easier to 
make than the due process arguments considered in Griffin, 
supra, and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right 
to counsel on first criminal appeal). In cases involving 
criminal appeals, the problem is that this Court has held that 
there is no constitutional right to any appeal at all. Ross 
v. Moffitt, supra, 417 U.S. at 611. Therefore it is hard to 
argue that due process requires free transcripts for indigent 
appellants, or that an appeal without appointed counsel is 
procedurally unfair. In addition, in an appellate situation, 
it is the appellant who is invoking the protection of the 
court, not the state that is forcing him to defend himself. 
See id., at 610-11. For all of these reasons, these appellate 
cases are based in part on equal protection considerations. 
Here, however, there are no such difficulties with 
the due process approach. The state has essentially forced 
appellee to bring this suit for its benefit, 3 and appellant is 
an unwilling participant. As a result, there is clearly a 
right to some form of due process rior to the declaration of 
paternity. The only difficult question is the kind of process 
that is due. Specifically, is this one of the situations in 
3Indeed, the State Attorney General is named as a party 
here, and appellee's brief was filed by him. 
7 . 
which the state must aid affirmatively one party's 
presentation of his case? Cf. Boddie, supra, at 376-77 
(filing fees for divorces) ("Resort to the judicial process by 
these plaintiffs is no more volutary in a realistic sense than 
· that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in 
court. In this posture we think that this appeal is 
properly to be resolved in light of the principles enunciated 
in our due process decisions that delimit rights of defendants 
compelled to litigate their differences in the judical 
forum.") . 
Answering this question requires a weighing of 
numerous factors--including the importance of the decision 
being made, the importance of the particular kind of evidence 
involved, the availability of alternative forms of evidence, 
and the countervailing state interests. In this case, all of 
these factors argue in favor of requiring states to pay for 
----------------- -blood tests. 
~ it is clear that this particular 
determination had great importance for a person in appellant's 
position. The finding of paternity creates a substantial 
financial obligation that is both immediate and continuing. 
Moreover, unlike other civil proceedings leading only to 
financial liability, this sort of suit has significant non-
financial consequences, both for the defendant and for his 
putative child. The court has decided that a parent/child 
relationship exists between these two persons. This 
8. 
determination is similar to the divorce determination 
considered so significant in Boddie, supra, at 374 ("Our 
conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage 
relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the 
concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally 
dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a 
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access 
to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of 
their marriages.") (emphasis added); Uniter.fStates v. Kras, 409 
U.S. 434 (1973) (Boddie distinguished on the ground that it 
involved fundamental interests, unlike a bankruptcy case). 
For this reason, this case is easily distinguishable from the 
average civil case. 
Next, it is clear that the particular piece of 
evidence that appellant wants the State to pay for is hardly 
~ -------- -- -------------------
insignificant. This blood test can exonerate over 90% of 
 
falsely accused men, and it is fair to say that it is a 
standard part of paternity suits in the United States today. 
The importance of this test becomes clear when one considers 
the alternatives available to appellant. 4 There are unlikely 
to be witnesses to the act of conception, and Connecticut has 
taken steps to make his own testimony legally irrelevant when 
4Appellant points to studies indicating that 
findings are quite likely to be erroneous. 






alone in contradiction 






this case from numerous others in which indigents might demand 
funding for the preparation of a civil or criminal case. 
Here, if appellant is consistently accused by the plaintiff, 
his trial has no real meaning at all unless he can of fer a 
blood test in evidence. For due process purposes, the trial 
becomes equivalent to an administrative declaration of 
paternity based solely on the woman's accusation. 
Finally, as the ACLU points out, the state's 
interest in refusing this payment is not very compelling. The 
state spends considerable amounts of money to bring these 
actions against indigents who, because of that status, are 
unlikely to be able to make substantial support payments. 
Once paternity is declared, the efforts to collect these 
payments is quite likely to result in higher costs than 
benefits. In this context, one suspects that the state is 
bringing this action as a matter of principle, rather than for 
financial reasons. If it chooses to do so, it seems fair to 
expect it to provide the single piece of evidence that can 
make the defense viable. 
II. Equal Protection 
I would decide this case on due process grounds and 
avoid the difficult question whether this case is a proper 
place in which to extend the cases involving benefits for 
indigents in the criminal justice system. See Douglas, supra; 
.. '!•. 
10. 
Griffin, supra. The equal protection theory has at least two 
analytical problems. 
inherently suspect.5 
First, a wealth classification is not 
Second, there is not really any 
classification here at all. The State is merely treating 
everyone, rich and poor, equally. Cf. Douglas, supra, at 361 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (To approach the present problem in 
terms of the Equal Protection Clause is, I submit, but to 
substitute resounding phrases for analysis .... The States, of 
course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from 
discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the 
formulation and application of their laws. But it is a far 
different thing to suggest that this provision prevents the 
State from adopting a law of general applicability that may 
af feet the poor more harshly than it does the rich .... ") . 
These problems are sufficiently formidable to counsel against 
an equal protection approach here. 
Conclusion and Summary 
In my view, appellant's due process argument has 
merit and should prevail. The only real argument against him 
is that, although fairness seems to be on his side, a victory 
5Professor Gunther suggests that a higher level 
applies when the wealth classification affects 
interests. G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 810 






for him lead the Court down a slippery slope. 
Obvious , there are many expensive evidentiary aids that the 
in civil and even criminal cases. Arguably, there is 
a danger that indigents will begin to demand payment for such 
devices when they are haled into court by the State. There 
are, however, several factors that make this situation unique 
and these can be emphasized. First, there is a fundamental 
this evidentiary device is interest involved. Second, 
peculiarly important and peculiarly determinative. Most 
importantly, the State gives little or no legal effect to the 
only other evidence likely to available to such a defendant--
his own testimony. These considerations render this case 
unique, and are sufficient to overcome the state's argument 
that due process does not require more than an open proceeding 
at which the defendant can present whatever evidence he can 
afford. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi ~
No: 1e~t!779 
Walter Little, Appellan~,I On. Appeal from the Appellata 
v. Se§sion of the Superior Court of 
Glori~ Streater. Connecticut. 
[May .-, 1981] 
CHIEF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This appeal presents the question whether a Connecticut 
statute, which provides that in Ea..!'.~rnity actions the cost of 
blood grouping tests is to be borne by the party requesting 
t~es the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of th'e Fourteenth Amendment when applied to deny such 
tests to indigent defendants. 
I 
On May 21, 1975, appellee Gloria Streater gave birth out 
of wedlock to a female child, Kenyatta Chantel Streater. As 
e. requirement stemming from her child's receipt of public as-
sistance, appellee identified appellant Walter Little as the 
child's father to the Connecticut Department of Social Serv-
ices. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 466-169 (1981) . The Depart-
ment then provided an attorney for appellee to bring a 
paternity suit against appellant in the Court of Common 
Pleas at New Haven to establish his liability for the child's 
support.1 
At the time the paternity action was commenced. appellant 
was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution 
at Enfield. Through his counsel, who was provided by a 
1 While the rase was pending, the Court of Common Pleas was merged 
















LITTLE v. STREATER 
legal aid organization, appellant moved the trial court to 
order blood grouping tests on appellee and her child pursuant 
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184 (1977), which later be~ 
came Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) and includes the 
provision that "[t]he costs of making such tests shall be 
chargeable against the party making the motion." 2 Appel-
lant asserted that he was indigent 8 and asked that the State 
be ordered to pay for the tests. The trial court granted the 
motion insofar as it sought blood grouping tests but denied 
the request that they be furnished at the State's expense. 
App. 8. 
For "financial reasons," no blood grouping tests were per-
formed even though they had been authorized. Id., at 12. 
Thf' paternity action was tried to the court on September 28, 
1978. Both anoellee a.nd appellant, who was still a state 
prisoner, testified at trial. Id .. at 14-19.4 After hearing the 
testimony, the court found that appellant was the child's 
2 In its entirety, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) states: 
"In any proceeding in which a question of paternity is an issue, the court, 
on motion of any party, may order the mother, her child, and the putn 
tive father or the husband of the mother to submit to one or more blood 
grouping tests, to be made by a qualified physician or other qualified per-
11on, designated by the court, to determine whether or not the putative 
father or the husband of the mother can be excluded as being the father 
of the child. The results of :-:uch tests shall be admissible in evidence only 
in rases where such result,, establish definite exclusion of the putativE· 
father or such husband a,, ,,uch father. The crsts of making surh teists 
shall be chargeable against the party making the motion." 
8 Appellant'i:; financial affidavit, which was tiled with the motion, showed 
that he had weekly income aud expenses of $5 and no assets. App. 7. 
The trial rourt later specifically found that, at the time of the motion, 
appellant "was indigent and could not afford to pay the costi, for blood 
grouping tests." Id., at 23. 
4 Although appellant admitted intimacy with appellee, he expresi,ed 
doubt that he was the child's father because of appellee's alleg?d relation-
ship with another man and because she had uot allowed him to see the 
ehild. App. 17- 18. 
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father. Id., at 20. Following a subsequent hearing on dam-
ages, the court entered judgment against appellant in the 
,amount of $6,974.28, which included the "lying-in" expenses 
of appellee and the child, "accrued maintenance" through 
October 31, 1978, and the "costs of suit plus reasonable at-
torney's fees." Id., at 20-21. In addition, appellant was 
ordered to pay child support at the rate of $2 per month-
$1 toward the arrearage amount of $6,974.28 and $1 toward 
a current monthly award of $163.58-directly to Connecti-
cut's Department of Finance and Control. lbid.5 
The Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court 
affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unreported per 
curiam opinion. Relying on its prior decision in Perro v. 
Morgan, 35 Conn. Supp. 689, 406 A. 2d 873, cert. denied, 177 
Conn. 753, 399 A. 2d 526 (1979), the Appellate Session held 
that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) does not violate the 
due process and equal protection ri~hts of an indigent defend-
ant in a paternity proceeding. The Appellate Session thus 
found no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion 
that the cost of blood grouping tests be paid by the State. 
App. 25. 
Thereafter, appellant's petition for certification was denied 
by the Connecticut Supreme Court, 180 Conn. 756, 414 A. 2d 
199 (1980); and we noted probable jurisdiction. - U. S. 
- (1980). 
II 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "No State 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law .... " Appellant argues that his right 
1 The minimal sum of $2 was ordered presumably because appellant wa 
indigent and incarcerated. However, his payments to the State are sub-
ject to future increase pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b--171 (1981) , 
which provides that "[a]ny order for the payment of [child] support 
... may at any time thereafter be ::,et aside or altered by any court 
issuing such order." 
4 
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to due process was abridged by the refusal, under Conn. Gen, 
Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) , to grant his request based on in,, 
·digency for State-subsidized blood grouping tests. 
Due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162 (1951) (concurring opinion) . 
Rather, it is "~e and calls for s~ch procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). In Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U. S. 371, 381 (1971), the Court held that "due 
process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervail-
ing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced 
to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial 
process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 
Accord, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965); 
Mullane v. Centralfianover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 
(1950). And inv'M~e, 424 U. S. 319, 335 
1 (1976), we explained: 
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct fac-
tors: First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 
These standards govern appellant's due process claim, 
which is premised on the unique quality of blood grouping 
tests as a source of exculpatory evidence, the State's promi-
nent role in the litigation, and the character of paternity 
actions under Connecticut law. 
·' 
., •, 




The discovery of human blood groups by Dr. Karl Land-
steiner in Vienna at the beginning of this century, and sub-
sequent understanding of their hereditary aspects, made pos-
sible the eventual use of blood tests to scientifically evaluate 
allegations of paternity. P. Speiser & F. Smekal, Karl Land-
steiner 89-93 (1975). Like their European counterparts, 
American courts gradually recognized the evidentiary value 
of blood grouping tests in paternity cases, and the modern 
status of such tests has been described by one commentator 
as follows: 
"As far as the accuracy, reliability, dependability-
even infallibility-of the test are concerned, there is no 
longer any controversy. The result of the test is uni-
versally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical 
authority. There is, in fact, no living authority of re-
pute, medical or legal, who may be cited adversely .... 
[T] here is now . . . practically universal and unani-
mous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling 
evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of pater-
nity." 1 S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings 
§ 9.13 (1975). 
The application of blood tests to the issue of paternity 
results from certain properties of the human blood groups 
and types : (a) the blood group and type of any individual 
can be determined at birth or shortly thereafter; (b) the 
blood group and type of every individual remains constant 
throughout life; and (c) the blood groups and types are in-
herited in accordance with Mendel's laws. Id., § 5.03. If 
the blood groups and types of the mother and child are 
known, the possible and impossible blood groups and types 
of the true father can be determined under the rules of in~ 
heritance. For example, a group AB child cannot have a 
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Similarly, a child cannot be type M unless one or both par-
ents are type M, and the factor rh' cannot appear in the 
blood of a child unless present in the blood of one or both 
parents. Id., §§ 5.03 and 6.02. Since millions of men be., 
long to the possible groups and types, a blood grouping test 
cannot conclusively establish paternity. However, it can 
demonstrate nonpaternity, such as where the alleged father 
belongs to group O and the child is group AB. It is a nega-
tive rather than an affirmative test with the potential to 
scientifically exclude the paternity of a falsely accused puta-
tive father. 
The ability of blood grouping tests to exonerate innocent 
putative fathers was confirmed by a 1976 report developed 
jointly by the American Bar Association and the American 
Medical Association. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & 
Krause. Joint AMA- ABA Guidelines: Present Status of 
Serologic Testing in Problems of Disµuted Parentage, 10 
Family L. Q. 247 (Fall 1976). The joint report recom~ 
mended the use of seven blood test "systems"- ABO, Rh, 
MNS, Kell , Duffy, Kidd, and HLA-when investigating 
questions of paternity. Id. , at 257-258. These systems 
were found to be "reasonable" in cost and to provide a 91 % 
cumulative probability of negating paternity for erroneously 
accused Negro men and 93 % for white men. Id., at 254, 
257. 
I The effectiveness of the seven systems attests the proba-tive value of blood test evidence in paternity cases. · The importance of that scientific evidence is heightened because 
"[t]here are seldom accurate or reliable eye witnesses since 
the sexual activities usually take place in · intimate and pri-
vate surroundings, and the self-serving testimony of a party 
is of questionable reliability." Larson, Blood · Test Exclu-
sion Procedures in Paternity Litigation : ·The Uniform Acts 
and Beyond, 13 J. Family L. 713 (1974). As JUSTICE BREN-
~-
t, 
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NAN wrote while a member of the Appellate Division of the 
New Jersey Superior Court: 
"[I]n the field of contested paternity ... the truth is 
so often obscured because social pressures create a con-
spiracy of silence or, worse, induce deliberate falsity. 
"The value of blood tests as a wholesome aid in the 
quest for truth in the administration of justice in these 
matters cannot be gainsaid in this day. Their reliabil., 
ity as an indicator of the truth has been fully estab-
lished. The substantial weight of medical and legal au-
thority attests their accuracy, not to prove paternity, 
and not always to disprove it, but 'they can disprove it 
conclusively in a grea.t many cases provided they are 
administered by specially qualified experts' .... " Cor-
tese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 156, 76 A. 2d 717, 
7Hl (1950). 
B 
Appellant emphasizes that, unlike a common dispute be-
tween private parties, the State's involvement in this pater-
nity proceeding was consiaerable and manifest, giving rise 
to a, constitutional duty. Because appellee's child was a re-
cipient of public assistance, Connecticut law compelled her, 
upon penalty of fine and im risonmen for contempt, "to 
di ose e ame of e putative father and to institute an 
act10n o es ao is tlie pa ermty o said child." Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 46b-169 (1981). See Maher v. Doe, 432 U. S. 526 
(1977); Roe v. Norton, 422 U. S. 391 (1975).0 The State's 
8 In response to an interrogatory, appellee, through her attorney, stated 
that her "continuing eligibility for r public] assistance required her to 
disclose [the] father's identity." App. 10. 
Connecticut's disclosure requirement is fostered by 42 U. S. C. § 654 ( 4), 
whirh directs that, as t·o a11y child born out of wrdlock for whom benefits 
under the _Aid to Fnmilies with Dependent Children program are claimed, 
the states must undertake "to establish ... paternity ... unless it is 
against the best interests of the child to do so" and "to secure support for 
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Attorney General automatically became a pa.rty to the ac~ 
tion, and any settlement agreement required his approval 
or that of the Commissioner of Human Resources or Com-
missioner of Income Maintenance. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 46b-160 and 46b-170 (1981). The State referred this 
mandatory paternity suit to appellee's lawyer "for prosecu-
tion" and paid his fee as well as all costs of the litigation. 
App. 10, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 34, 40.7 In addition, the 
State will be the recipient of the monthly support payments 
to be made by appellant pursuant to the trial court's judg-
ment. App. 31. "State action" has undeniably pervaded 
this case. Accordingly, appellant need not, and does not, 
contend that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation to 
fund blood tests for an indigent's defense in ordinary civil 
litigation between private parties. 
The nature of paternity proceedings in Connecticut also 
bears heavily o;;' appellant's due- process claim. Although 
the State characterizes such proceedings as "civil," see Rob-
ertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 365 A. 2d 824, cert. denied, 
429 U. S. 852 (1976), they have "quasi-criminal" overtones. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-171 (198l JProvTues tnat if a- puta-
tive father "is found guilty, the court shall order him to stand 
charged with the support and maintenance of such child" 
(emphasis added); and his subsequent failure to comply 
with the court's support order is punishable by imprison-
ment under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-171, 46b-215, and 53-
304 (1981). Cf. Walker v. Stokes, 45 Ohio App. 2d 275, 
278, 344 N. E. 2d 159, 161 (1975); People v. Doherty, 261 
App. Div. 86, 88, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 821, 823 (1941). 
Moreover, the defendant in a Connecticut paternity action 
faces an unusual evidentiary obstacle. Connecticut's orig-
. inal "bastardy" statute was enacted in 1672, see The Book 
7 At oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut 
acknowledged that the cost of any witnesses for the plaintiff in a proceed--
ing such as this also would be paid by the State. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. 
,, 
.,• .. · 
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of the General Laws for the People Within the Jurisdiction 
of Connecticut 6 (1673), and from 1702 until 1902 it stated 
in pertinent part: "And if such woman shall continue con-
stant in her accusation, being put to the discovery, in the 
time of her travail, and also examined on the trial of the 
cause, it shall be prima facie evidence that such accused per-
son is the father of such child." Masher and Bennett, 108 
Conn. 671, 672, 144 A. 297 (1929). In Booth v. Hart, 43 
Conn. 480 ( 1876), the Connecticut Supreme Court construed 
this statutory language as follows: 
''[For 146 years], pa.rties to suits with but one exception 
could not testify in their own behalf. But in cases of 
illegitimate children, ... an exception was made of suits 
brought by [a mother] for the maintenance of [her J 
child, and she was allowed to testify who was its father 
under certain safeguards provided by the statute. And 
the statute went on to provide that if she should con-
tinue constant in her accusation, being examined on oath 
and put to the discovery in the time of her travail, the 
person whom she declared to be the father of her child 
should be adjudged to be so, unless from the evidence 
introduced by him the triers should be of the opinion 
that he was innocent of the charge. The existence of 
these few facts were all that was necessary to maintain 
the suit in the first instance, and the burden of proof then 
changed to the defendant, and he was required to prove 
himself innocent of the accusation by other evidence than 
his own." Id., at 485. 
In 1848, the Connecticut Legislature enacted a statute pro-
viding that "no person shall be disqualified as a witness in 
any a.ction by reason of his interest in the event of the same 
as a party or otherwise." Id., at 481. Since the defendant 
in a. paternity action was no longer precluded from testify-
ing in his own behalf, the 1848 statute removed the need for 
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the time of her travail." Id., at 486. In its tp.odern form, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-160 (1981) simply states that "if 
~mch mother or expectant mother continues constant in her 
accusation, it shall be evidence that the respondent is the 
father of such child." Nevertheless, in Mosher v. Bennett, 
gupra, 108 Conn., at 674, 144 A., at 298, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held: 
"The mother still has the right to rely upon the prima 
facie case made out by constancy in her accusation. She 
is no longer required under oath to make such discovery 
at the time of her travail. The prima facie case so 
rnade out places upon the reputed fat her the burden of 
8howiny his innocence of the charge, and under our prac-
tice he must do this by other evidence than his own;n 
(Emphasis added.) 
Accord, Kelsaw v. Green, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516, 519-520, 276 
A. 2d 909, 911-912 (1971).8 
Under Connecticut law, therefore, the defendant in a pater,. 
nity suit is placed at a distinct disadvantage in that his testi-
mony alone is insufficient to overcome the plaintiff's prima· 
facie case. Among the most probative additional evidence 
the defendant might offer are the results of blood groupi11g· 
tests, but if he is indigent, the State essentially denie,l him 
that reliable scientific proof by requiring that he bear its cost. 
e At oral argument, the State's Assistant Attorney General represented 
that "[c]urrently th[isl 1s the Jaw of Connecticut," Tr. of Oral Arg. 46; 
and, when presented with a hypothetical situation, hhl response illustrated 
the practical operation of the evidentiary rule : 
" QUESTION : [D]oes that mean .. . that [if] she takes the stand 
[and says] , 'he's the father, he's the father, he's the father, he's the father.' ' 
She never deviates. . . . He takes the stand and says, 'I am not, I am 
not, I am not , I am not.' And the factfinder believes him and doesn't 
believe her, you're saying-
"[COUNSEL'S ANSWER]: If that was the te8timony, she would win.' '" 
':l;r.. of Oral Arg. 44.. · 
s 
,. 
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See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46h-"'168 ( 1981). In substance, the 
State has created an adverse presumption regarding the de~ 
fondant's testimony by elevating the weight to be accorded 
the mother's imputation of him. If the plaintiff has been 
"constant" in her accusation of paternity, the defendant car-
ries the burden of proof and faces severe penalties if he does 
not meet that burden and fails to comply with the judgment 
entered against him. Yet not only is the State inextricably 
involved in paternity litigation such as this and responsible 
for an imbalance between the parties, it in effect forecloses 
what is potentially a conclusive means for an indigent de~ 
fendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself. 
Such a practice is irreconcilable with the command of the 
Due Process Clause. 
C 
Our holding in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 335, set 
forth three elements to be evaluated in determining what 
process is constitutionally due: the private interests at stake; 
the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous re-
sults and the probable value of the suggested procedural 
safeguard; and the governmental interests affected. Anal-
ysis of those considerations weighs in appellant's favor. 
The private interests implicated here are substantial. 
Apart from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoid-
ing a substantial support obligation and liberty interest 
threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at 
issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This 
Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial 
bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded 
them constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972). Just as the termination of such 
bonds demands procedural fairness, see Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, - U. S. - (1981), so too does 
their imposition. Through the judicial process, the State 
properly endeavors to identify the father of a child born out 
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teuance. Obviously, both the child and the defendant in a 
paternity action have a compelling interest in the accuracy 
of such a determination.0 
Given the usual absence of witnesses, the self-interest 
coloring the testimony of the litigants, and the State's oner-
ous evidentiary rule and refusal to pay for blood grouping 
tests, the risk is not inconsiderable that an indigent defend-
ant in a Connecticut paternity proceeding will be erroneously 
adjudged the. father of the child in question. See generally 
H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 106-108 
(1971). Further, because of its recognized capacity to de-
finitively exclude a high percentage of falsely accused puta-
tive fathers, the availability of scientific blood test evidence 
clearly would be a valuable procedural safeguard in such 
cases. See id., at 123-137; Part II-A, supra. Connecticut 
has acknowledged as much in § 46b-168 of its statutes by 
providing for the ordering of blood tests and the admissibil-
ity of nega,tive findings. See n. 2. supra. Unlike other evi-
dence that may be susceptible to varying interpretation or dis-
paragement, blood test results, if obtained under proper 
conditions by qualified experts, are difficult to refute. Thus, 
access to blood grouping tests for indigent defendants such 
as appellant would help to insure the correctness of pater-
nity decisions in Connecticut. 
The State admittedly has a legitimate interest in the wel-
0 In its report on the 1974 Social Services Amendments to the Social 
Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 654, 655, ct al., the Senate Finance Committee 
stated: 
"In taking the position that a child born out of wedlock has a right 
to have its paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner, the Com-
mittee acknowledges that legil:ilation must recognize the interest primarily 
at stake in the paternity action to be that of the child. . . . The Com-
mitee is convinced that ... paternity can be ascertained with real:ionable-
ssurance, particularly through the m;e of scientifically conducted blood' 
typing." S. Rep. No. 93-1356., 93d Cong., 2d SeSll. 52 (1974). 
ce- n. 6, suprw. 
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fare of a child born out of weclleck who is receiving public 
assistance, as well as in securing support for the child from 
those legally responsible. In addition, it shares the interest 
of the child and the defendant in an accurate and just deter-
mination of paternity. See Regulations of Connecticut State 
Agencies § 17-82e-4 ( 1979). Nevertheless, the State also 
has financial concerns; it wishes to have the paternity actions 
in which it is involved proceed as economically as possible 
and, hence, seeks to avoid the expense of blood grouping 
tests.10 Pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 655, however, the states are 
entitled to reimbursement of 75% of the funds they expend 
on operation of their approved child support plans, a11d 
regulations promulgated under authority of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1302 make clear that such federal financial participation is 
available for the development of evidence to establish pa-
ternity, "including the use of ... blood tests." 45 CFR 
§ 304.20 (b)(2)(i)(B) (1980). Moreover, following the ex-
ample of other states, the expense of blood grouping tests for 
an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity suit could 
be advanced by the Stat€ and then taxed as costs to the 
parties. See Ark. Rev. Stat. § 34.705.1 (1962); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 23--132 (1974); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:397.1 (West Supp. 
1981); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 522:3 (1974); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
§'109.256 (1979); Tex. Family Code Ann. § 13.03 (b) (Ver-
non Supp. 1980).11 We must conclude that the State's mone-
10 Laboratorirs survryed in a 1977 study sponsored by the Departmrnt 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department Health and 
Human Services) chargrd an average of approximately $245 for a 
battery of test systems that led to a minimum exclusion rate of 80%. 
H . E. W. Office of Child Support Enforcement, Blood Testing to Establish 
Paternity 35-37 (1977). According to appellant, blood grouping tests 
were available at the Hartford Hospital for $250 at the time this 
paternity action was pending trial, but the cost has since been increased 
to $460. Brief for Appellant 4, and n. 5. 
11 Other jurisdictions also make blood grouping tests available 1o indi-
gents by statute. See, e. (] ., Ala. Code § 26-12-5 (1977); D. C: Code 
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tary interest "is hardly significant enough to overcome private 
interests as important as those here." Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services, supra, at-. 
Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates 
that appellant did not receive the process he was constitu-
tionally due. Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence 
in a paternity case, an indigent defendant, who faces the 
State as an adversary when the child is a recipient of public 
assistance and who must overcome the evidentiary burden 
Connecticut imposes, is effectively denied "a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard." Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 
381.12 Therefore, "the requirement of 'fundamental fair-
Code § 16-66G (Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.7Hi (c) 
(1968); Minn . Stat. Ann. § 257.69 (2) (Supp. 1981); N. D. Cent. Code 
§ 14-17-15 (Supp. 1977); Pa. CoPs. Stat. Ann . § 42-6132 (Purdon Supp. 
1980) ; Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-23 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.48 (5) 
(Wt>st Supp. 1980) . In addition, the highest courts of Colorado, Mas-
sachusetts, and West Virginia have held that putative fathers may not 
constitutionally be denied access to blood grouping tests on the basis of 
indigency. See Franklin v. District Court, 194 Colo. 189, 571 P. 2d 1072 
(1977) ; Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N. E . 2d 667 
(1969) ; State ex rel . Graves v. Daugherty, 266 S. E . 2d 142 (W. Va. 
1980) . 
Apart from Connecticut, it also appearb that North CaFolina requires 
all d~fendants requesting blood tests in paternity proceedmgs, irrespective 
of means , "to initially be responsible for any of the expenses thereof" or 
do without them . N. C. Gen . Stat. § 8-50.1 (b) (2) (Supp. 1979). 
12 In Boddie, we held that due process prohibits a state from denying Hn 
indigent arcrss to its divorce courts because of inability to pay filing fees 
and eost1;. However, in United States v. Kras, 409 U S. 434 (1973) , and 
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973), the Court concluded that due 
process does not require waiver of filing fees for an indigent :;eeking a 
discharge in bankruptcy or appellate review of an agency determination 
rrsulting in reduced welfare benefits. Our deci:;ions in Kras and Ortwein 
emphasized the availability of other relief and the less " fundamental" 
eharacter of the private interest::; at stake than tho1;e implicated in Boddie. 
Berausz appellant has no choice of an alternative forum and his interests, 
as well as those of the child, are constitutionally significant, this case is 
comparable to Boddie rather than to Kras and Ortwein. '{ 
,, 
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ness' " expressed by the Due Process Clause was not satisfieq 
here. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, supra, at 
-. 
III 
" [A] statute .. . may be held constitutionally invalid as 
?,pplied when it operates to deprive an individual of a pro-
tected right although its general validity as a measure enacted 
in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question." 
Boddie v. Connecticut, sitpra, at 379. Thus, "a cost require-
ment, valid on its face, may offend due process because it 
operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be 
heard." Id., at 380. We hold that, in these specific circum-
stances, the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) 
to deny appellant blood grouping tests because of his lack 
of financial resources violated the due process guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.n Accordingly, the judgment 
of the Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court 
is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
, 13 Because of our disposition of appellant 's due proce~s claim, we need 
n.ot consider whether the statute, as applied, also violated the Equal 
P rotection Clause. 
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Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS 01' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~ttttt ~l11ttt itf tJrt ~b ~ht.tt-
--&$lpnghm. J. ~ 2D.;i~.;l 
Re: No. 79-6779 - Little v. Streater 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincer~ly, -t ~· pc,_' _~, 
_,/ 
May 27, 1981 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:%5ttprtmt QJourl of tqt ~th .:§tafts 
'J!Uasqington, 10. QJ. 2lJffeJ.l..;l 
May 27, 1981 
Re: No. 79-6779 Little v. Streater 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
l~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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